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Our research suggests that firms condition their CSR policies on the availability of economic resources. 
Using the value of a firm’s real estate as a measure of exogenous shocks on the firm’s economic resources, 
we show that increases in resources reduce CSR concerns, while decreases in resources increase CSR 
concerns. The relative impact of resource availability on CSR concerns, however, depends on several 
organizational variables that influence a firm’s preferences for CSR investments. Furthermore, we show 
that firm reactions to increases and decreases in resources are not symmetric: resource gains reduce CSR 
concerns, but resource losses increase CSR concerns even more markedly. Overall, these results suggest 
that firms may treat CSR decisions in much the same way as other investment decisions. 
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Why do firms engage in socially disapproved behaviors? What factors discourage such behaviors 
in favor of social responsibility? In 2007, about 84% of U.S. public firms engaged in at least one “socially 
disapproved” behavior (as defined and determined by KLD Research and Analytics, Inc.; hereafter “KLD”). 
The average number of such behaviors was 2, with a range of 0-18, including categories like community, 
environment, diversity, employee, product safety, and humanity. Given ample evidence of links between 
socially disapproved corporate behaviors and negative consequences like lawsuits, market share 
deterioration, network partner losses, and public disapproval (e.g., Strachan, et al., 1983; Davidson, et al., 
1994; Baucus and Baucus, 1997; Haunschild, et al., 2006; Karpoff, et al., 2008; and Nossiter, 2010), the 
continued prevalence of socially disapproved behaviors remains puzzling, and the contributing factors 
remain important to investigate.  
Beyond the obvious practical import of socially disapproved behaviors (hereafter “CSR concerns” 
in accordance with KLD terminology), the continued prevalence of such behaviors  cuts to the heart of 
important theoretical puzzles in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature. For example, Martin 
and Moser (2016) show that investors respond favorably when managers make and disclose the societal 
benefits of investments, and numerous papers show that avoiding CSR concerns has significant 
consequences for firm performance and resources (e.g., Benlemlih & Bitar, 2016; Cheng, Ioannou, & 
Serafeim, 2014; Jo, et al., 2009; Simpson and Koshers, 2002; Trudel and Cotte, 2009; Wu and Shen, 2013, 
and Kruger, 2015). If that is the case, why does further reducing CSR concerns (and enhancing CSR 
strengths) in core business functions remain the most significant leadership challenge facing companies 
today (State of Sustainable Business Survey by BSR, 2014)1? Is it possible that mitigating CSR concerns 
requires resources that firms simply do not have?  
That is the topic of the current research. We suggest that resource availability may be central to 
decisions about whether to avoid socially disapproved behaviors. To date, research has amassed more 
evidence for the opposite causal path—that decreased CSR concerns improve firm performance and thus 
increase resource availability (e.g., Benlemlih & Bitar, 2016; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Jo, et al., 
2009; Simpson and Koshers, 2002). Yet, theory suggests that resource availability could also drive CSR 
decisions (Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997), and 
scholars have explicitly called for empirical research into that possibility (e.g., Benlemlih & Bitar, 2016). 
We respond to the call by exploring whether, when, and how a causal link from resource availability to 
socially disapproved behaviors might emerge. In terms of whether such a link might emerge, if firms regard 
                                                          




CSR as one of several investment options2, then changes in firm economic resources could influence CSR 
investments much as these changes influence other investment decisions. Just as shocks to U.S. corporations’ 
real estate value during the housing boom period influenced their aggregate investment (Chaney et al., 
2010), for example, such shocks might influence firms’ CSR activities. On the other hand, if firms see CSR 
investments as a “cost of doing business,” matching their CSR concerns to their peer organizations (Matten 
& Moon, 2008), then there should be no causal relationship between firm resources and CSR. This 
perspective also accords with economic theory suggesting that companies should maximize shareholders’ 
value rather than internalizing the negative externalities they impose on other stakeholders (e.g., Pigou, 
1920; Friedman, 1970). Testing these dueling perspectives on the influence of firm resources on CSR 
concerns (i.e., exploring whether such a causal path exists) is our first objective.  
Even if firms do consider CSR an investment decision, they might not place CSR activities at the 
top of their investment priorities. One possible factor that could shape a firm’s investment preference is 
financial constraint. Prior research suggests that firms place their core business investment needs at the top 
of the investment hierarchy and CSR somewhere lower (e.g., Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). One critical implication is that firms’ CSR-related reactions to resource changes may depend 
on whether their core business investment needs have already been met—that is, whether they are 
financially constrained. Financially constrained firms still have unmet business needs. Thus, positive 
resource shocks should create little financial slack, and these firms are more likely to use their gains to meet 
essential business needs such as capital expenditure and/or M&As. Financial constraint is only one of 
several variables that may influence where CSR concerns rank in a firm’s investment priorities. To offer 
insight into some other important influences, we examine three critical variables highlighted by the 
literature: political influences (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014), corporate governance (Harjoto and Jo, 
2011), and analyst coverage (Knyazeva, 2007, Yu, 2008, and Harjoto and Jo, 2011). Testing the impact of 
financial constraint and other relevant organizational variables that might influence the relationship 
between firm resources and CSR concerns (i.e., exploring when the causal path unfolds) represents our 
second objective.  
If resource availability does influence firms’ CSR concerns, it is important to know how firms react 
to resource gains and resource losses, and particularly if they react symmetrically. One important reason is 
that asymmetric reactions would lead to markedly different patterns of CSR concerns in good and bad 
economic conditions. To illuminate firms’ CSR responses to resource gains and losses, we draw from 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and its application to top-management teams (e.g., Barberis 
                                                          
2 Godfrey (2005), for example, presents a theory suggesting that corporations increase philanthropy to generate 
moral capital, which provides “insurance-like” protection for shareholder wealth. Minor and Morgan (2011) show 
that enhanced CSR reputation protects firms from negative corporate events like product recalls. 
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et al., 2001; Grinblatt and Han, 2005). Though originally conceived as a theory of individual decision-
making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Coval and Shumway, 2005), prospect theory has been invoked by 
many subsequent scholars to explain firm-level behavior (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988; Fiegenbaum, 
et al., 1996; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Sanders, 2001)—the logic 
being that top management team members make decisions in accordance with prospect theory, and these 
decisions become firm-level policy that also reflects prospect theory. 
At the most fundamental level, prospect theory and its extensions suggest a negative relationship 
between economic resources and CSR concerns: To recoup losses, a decrease in resources should increase 
a firm’s appetite for risky behaviors like CSR concerns (e.g., investing less in employee welfare, cutting 
back on community contributions, spending less on product safety). To protect gains, a resource increase 
should decrease a firm’s appetite for risky CSR concern behaviors. Additionally, prospect theory indicates 
that “losses loom larger than gains,” meaning that decision-makers are more sensitive to losses. By that 
logic, firms with losses should increase their CSR concerns (engage in socially disapproved behavior) more 
readily than firms with gains should decrease their concerns (reduce socially disapproved behavior). Finally, 
prospect theory’s “certainty effect” suggests that sure losses or gains have stronger behavioral effects than 
tenuous losses or gains. Thus, we predict that the effect of resource availability on CSR concerns will be 
strongest when losses or gains are relatively more permanent. In sum, prospect theory and its subsequent 
applications suggest that firm resources may drive CSR behavior in systematic (and potentially troubling) 
ways. Testing whether firms react symmetrically to resource gains and losses (i.e., exploring how the causal 
path unfolds) is thus our third objective.  
In sum, this study seeks to shed light on the relationship between firm resources and CSR concerns 
by determining whether exogenous changes in firm resources, particularly via real estate assets, could 
influence a firm’s engagement in CSR concern behaviors. To isolate the effects of resource availability on 
CSR, we identify the change in the value of firm real estate assets as an exogenous shock on firm resources 
(Chaney et al., 2012). Specifically, we treat variations in local real estate prices as exogenous shocks to 
examine whether firms engage in more or fewer CSR concerns as their asset value changes unexpectedly. 
Using exogenous real estate shocks helps to mitigate the concern that some firm resource changes are driven 
by past CSR policies. Thus, our research can speak rather directly to the nature of the causal path from 
resource availability to CSR, which is unique in the CSR literature. Following Chaney et al. (2012), our 
estimated resource variable is RE Value. The average RE Value is 0.496 (median is 0.352)3, suggesting that 
real estate represents almost half of the tangible assets held by firms in our sample.  
                                                          
3 The median RE Value is comparable to the value of 0.28 reported by Chaney et al. (2012). They use the same data 
period as ours but include all firms that report real estate ownership in 1993. Because of CSR data availability, we 
use a smaller sample that includes relatively larger firms. 
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 Controlling for year and firm fixed effects, an OLS regression analysis clustering observations at 
the state-year level supports a negative relationship between real estate shocks and the number of CSR 
concerns, suggesting that firms do in fact view CSR as an investment decision, which is influenced by the 
availability of economic resources. Specifically, a 2.84-percentage increase (decrease) in real estate value 
leads to one reduction (addition) to the number of CSR concerns, ceteris paribus.  
To investigate whether firm financial constraints influence this relationship, we first split our data 
by the level of financial constraint faced by our firms. In support of our conjecture, the reported negative 
effect of real estate shocks is particularly evident in the group of firms without financial constraints (those 
that have already met their core business needs). For these firms, just a one percentage increase in RE Value 
(compared to the 2.84-percentage increase among all firms and a non-significant impact among constrained 
firms) leads to one reduction in CSR concerns. As further evidence, we examine the other types of 
investments financially constrained firms make with gains from real estate shocks. In contrast to the non-
significant effects of resource gains on CSR concerns, financially constrained firms use these resources to 
make capital expenditures and invest in intangible assets (such as patents or goodwill increased through 
mergers and acquisitions).      
As noted, we also examine whether and how political concerns, corporate governance, and analyst 
scrutiny influence the relationship between resources and CSR concerns. First, consistent with our 
predictions and past research indicating that Democratic CEOs and Democratic-leaning firm locations are 
associated with fewer CSR concerns, we find that the negative effects of RE Value are especially evident 
for firms led by Democratic CEOs. For instance, among firms with a Democratic (versus Republican) CEO, 
a one percentage increase (decrease) in RE Value appears to lead to twelve times as many reductions 
(additions) in CSR concerns when the HPI (House Price Index4) prices are more stable. Yet, this also 
significantly challenges prior theory by suggesting that “Democratic” firms are not only more willing to 
reduce CSR concerns in “good” times; they may be more likely to increase CSR concerns in “bad” times. 
Second, we find that the negative relationship between RE Value and CSR concerns is particularly evident 
in firms that closely align the interests of the CEO and shareholders, as measured by the extent to which 
CEOs’ personal wealth is exposed to firm stock price changes. Lastly, we find that the effect of real estate 
shocks on CSR concerns is particularly strong in firms subject to more financial analyst scrutiny, and the 
effect grows even stronger when the number of analysts increases. Specifically, the negative effect of RE 
Value on CSR concerns is about eight times higher in the group of firms with six or more financial analysts 
than in the group of firms with fewer analysts. These findings are all consistent with theory, as explained 
below. 




To compare firms’ CSR responses to resource gains and losses, we split the sample into firm-years 
with resource gains and firm-years with resource losses. Consistent with the predictions of prospect theory, 
we find that the negative impact of real estate value on CSR concerns is four times stronger when firms 
experience real estate losses than gains. That is, they are willing to incur four times more CSR concerns 
after a real estate loss than the CSR concerns they alleviate after a real estate gain. Furthermore, consistent 
with prospect theory’s suggestion that reactions are stronger when gains and losses are relatively certain, 
the variation in firms’ reaction to real estate shocks is particularly strong in states with less volatile (more 
stable) real estate prices.  
Lastly, we check the fundamental assumption, underlying our theory, that changes in real estate 
value impact the availability of economic resources. Chaney et al. (2012) specifically suggest that real estate 
value impacts a firm’s investments by affecting its pledgeable assets and therefore its debt capacity. To test 
our assumptions, we empirically examine this potential mechanism for the effect of real estate shocks on 
CSR concerns. We first examine how shocks in real estate value impact debt financing, which is measured 
by the issuance of bonds and the amount of proceeds raised from new bond issuance. We find that firms 
are more likely to issue bonds and raise more proceeds from bond issuance when they experience positive 
real estate shocks, supporting the impact of real estate shocks on the value of pledgeable assets. We then 
show that the coefficient of real estate shocks on CSR concerns is -1.135 in the subsample of firms that 
issue bond securities, substantially and significantly higher than the -0.193 in the subsample of firms 
without bond issuance. The results therefore support our conjecture that real estate shocks impact firms’ 
economic resources, especially through debt financing, which leads to changes in firms’ CSR behaviors. 
 Overall, our research suggests that CSR concerns depend on the availability of firm resources. The 
relative attractiveness of adjustments to CSR concerns, however, depends on several organizational 
variables that influence firms’ investment preferences (financial constraint, political climate, corporate 
governance, and analyst coverage). Finally, firm reactions to resource gains and losses are not symmetric: 
resource gains reduce CSR concerns, but resource losses increase CSR concerns even more markedly, 
leading firms to cut proverbial corners.  
 Our study contributes to the literature on the link between firm resources and CSR (see Kitzmueller 
and Shimshack, 2012 for a review on the economics of CSR). This literature has revealed negative, positive, 
and neutral links (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; 2001), partially because of the difficulties in establishing 
causality. Recent studies provide ample evidence on the ways that CSR impacts firm performance. For 
example, Cheng et al. (2014) show that CSR performance impacts firms’ access to finance. Benlemlih and 
Bitar (2016) show that firms with higher CSR scores are have lower investment inefficiency. And Servaes 
and Tamayo (2013) and Kruger (2015) show that CSR impacts firm value. Our paper differs by focusing 
on the opposite causal relationship—that is, the path from firm resource availability to CSR policies. To 
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our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to provide genuine causal and empirical evidence about the 
influence of firm resources on CSR, and our data clearly document such a relationship. Our findings 
contribute to the corporate finance literature by documenting an important and previously unexamined 
driver of CSR. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and methods underlying the results presented in section 4, and the paper 
concludes in section 5.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Firm Economic Resources and CSR 
According to KLD, examples of specific socially disapproved behaviors include community concerns (e.g., 
tax, environmental, and water rights disputes), corporate governance concerns (e.g., accounting and 
transparency issues),5 diversity concerns (e.g., controversies resulting in fines or civil penalties and non-
representation of women on boards), employee concerns (e.g., health and safety and retirement benefits), 
environmental concerns (e.g., hazardous waste and ozone depleting chemicals), human rights concerns (e.g., 
controversial operations in foreign countries and labor rights issues), and product safety concerns (e.g., 
product safety issues, consumer fraud, and antitrust). Recognizing that individuals have different opinions 
as to what constitutes a CSR “concern,” we nevertheless use KLD’s categories given their wide adoption 
in the field of CSR (e.g., Chatterji et al, 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Lange and Washburn, 2012; Moser 
and Martin, 2012, Hoi et al., 2013). 
Both the practitioner and academic discourse on CSR reveal ambivalence about the links between 
CSR and firm economic resources. On the one hand, both shareholders and consumers appear to take firms’ 
social performance into consideration when making decisions. For example, more than a quarter of 
participants in a U.S.-based survey have bought or sold shares based on a company’s social performance, 
and about 42% of North American consumers have punished socially irresponsible companies by not 
buying their products (International Institute for Sustainable Development)6. Accordingly, firms appear to 
be responding to social demands for responsible behavior: More companies than ever are investing in 
environmental, social, and governance issues (Di Giuli and Kostovetsy, 2014) 7, and the majority of 
                                                          
5 Recent studies (Kruger, 2015; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) exclude corporate governance from the CSR measure. 
We run robustness tests by excluding corporate governance from our CSR concerns, and the results remain 
qualitatively the same. 
6 See survey reported by International Institute for Sustainable Development: 
https://www.iisd.org/business/issues/sr_csrm.aspx.  




executives expect to allocate additional resources to every dimension of corporate citizenship in the near 
future [State of Corporate Citizenship (SCC), 2014]. On the other hand, survey data suggest that managers 
see the implementation of further CSR activities as their most significant leadership challenge (State of 
Sustainable Business Survey, 2014, by BSR), suggesting that further CSR implementation may depend on 
resources that firms do not currently have—or even that future CSR activities may depend on their future 
performance (Lys et al., 2015). In sum, the practitioner literature provides some reason to believe that firm 
resource availability may influence CSR. 
 The academic literature has also long been divided on the relationship between CSR and firm 
economic resources (see a comprehensive review by Griffin and Mahon, 1997). As noted, the bulk of the 
empirical research has focused on the causal link from CSR behavior to firm performance, generally 
documenting that fewer CSR concerns (and more CSR strengths) lead to improved performance (e.g., 
Benlemlih & Bitar, 2016; Cheng et al., 2014; Deng et al., 2013; Jo, et al., 2009; Simpson and Koshers, 
2002; Trudel and Cotte, 2009; Wu and Shen, 2013, and Kruger, 2015). For example, Cheng and colleagues 
(2014) showed that stronger CSR performance predicted greater access to finance by improving stakeholder 
engagement and increasing transparency, while Benlemlih & Bitar (2016) showed that CSR performance 
positively predicts investment efficiency. Despite these compelling findings, the literature has also 
suggested the possibility of a negative relationship (Wright and Ferris, 1997), and a series of highly-cited 
papers have integrated these findings by providing theoretical and statistical reasons to believe that the link 
may, on average, be neutral (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; 2001).  
 Additionally, several influential theoretical papers (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997) as well as a novel empirical paper (Lys et al., 2015) have suggested that the causality might 
run in the other direction. That is, they have suggested that firm financial performance might predict CSR 
behavior. Lys and colleagues (2015), for example, showed that firm managers invest in increased CSR 
when they privately learn that the firm will perform well in the future. According to this argument, the 
actual improved performance may occur in the future, but the awareness of improved performance precedes 
and causally precipitates the CSR decision. In other words, (anticipated) performance represents a causal 
predictor of CSR decisions (Lys et al., 2015). Note that this perspective is not necessarily in conflict with 
the perspective that CSR decisions predict firm performance, as the causality could run in both directions 
as part of a feedback loop. For example, the anticipation of improved performance could drive increased 
CSR, which could later contribute to performance over and above the performance improvement anticipated 
initially.   





In sum, the literature provides some strong theoretical (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997) and empirical (Lys et al., 2015) reasons to suspect that firm financial performance and 
associated financial resources may drive CSR in addition to the reverse. Indeed, some of the scholars who 
have argued that CSR predicts firm performance (Benlemlih & Bitar, 2016) have also acknowledged that 
firms’ “actual CSR decisions depend mainly on the resources available” (p. 4), that their own empirical 
approach “cannot confirm a causal relationship” (p. 21), and that future research may wish to “extend the 
framework…by examining the direction of causation between these two variables” (p. 21). We build from 
the existing theory and evidence as well as Benlemlih & Bitar (2016)’s call for research to examine the 
possibility that an exogenous indicator of firm financial performance—the performance of real estate 
assets—may predict CSR concerns. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Investment Opportunities and CSR Concerns 
CSR need not be a charitable donation nor a marketing scheme. The CSR literature has presented some 
links between firms’ CSR policies and their actual risk management and performance, suggesting that firms 
might see CSR as an investment. Godfrey (2005), for example, presents a theory suggesting that 
corporations increase philanthropy to generate moral capital, which provides “insurance-like” protection 
for shareholder wealth. Minor and Morgan (2011) show that enhanced CSR reputation protects firms from 
negative corporate events like product recalls. Several leading companies including GE, Nestle, and 
Johnson & Johnson have started incorporating CSR into their daily business operations under the “shared 
value” model (Porter and Kramer, 2011), which emphasizes that firms can generate economic value in a 
way that also produces value for society. These developments, both theoretical and organizational, suggest 
that at least some firms may see at least some forms of CSR as an investment.  
We focus specifically on CSR concerns, investigating whether firms see concern reduction as a 
possible investment (and an increase in concerns as a shift toward other investments). CSR concerns not 
only summarize overall CSR performance well but also predict negative future events more accurately than 
positive CSR activities (e.g., Chatterji et al, 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Lange and Washburn, 2012; 
Moser and Martin, 2012, Hoi et al., 2013). Furthermore, CSR concerns may be a more important 
determinant of firm value than responsible behavior (Clark, 2008; Frooman, 1997; McGuire et al., 2003; 
Kruger, 2015). Thus, concerns represent an important consideration in their own right. 
How might real estate shocks influence firms’ investments in CSR concerns? In a perfect market, 
where all firms have equal access to capital markets, this and all of a firm’s investment decisions would be 
independent of its financing conditions (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Markets, nevertheless, are imperfect, 
and access to external finance does matter for investment decisions. Studies show that if a firm has difficulty 
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obtaining outside finance, its investments display excess sensitivity to the availability of internal funds.8 
 So the availability of external capital matters for decisions about whether to invest, and the literature 
also suggests that, in the presence of financing frictions, it may also influence the types of investment 
choices firms make. For example, Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that factors such as investment tax credits or 
depreciation allowances may be more important than the cost of capital for investment decisions. These 
findings suggest that, in the presence of financing frictions, real estate shocks may influence firms’ 
investment choices. Consistent with this possibility, Chaney et al. (2012) show that increases in real estate 
value increase firms’ collateral value and therefore their debt capacity, which in turn increase their 
aggregate investment: Over the period 1993-2007, U.S. corporations invested $0.06 out of each $1 of 
collateral. This positive impact of collateral value on aggregate investment is particularly evident for 
financially constrained firms. Specifically, treating the change in a firm’s real estate assets as an external 
shock on its collateral value, studies link real estate value changes to firms’ investments (Chaney et al., 
2012), capital structure (Cvijanovic, 2014), and cost of capital (e.g. Berger et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2011).  If 
firms see CSR concern reduction as an investment decision, and if resource changes like increases in real 
estate value influence a firm’s investment choices, then resource changes should predict CSR concerns: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Firms consider CSR concern reduction an investment decision, resulting in a negative 
relationship between firm economic resource changes and CSR concerns. 
  
On the other hand, firms may seek to reduce CSR concerns because they anticipate negative 
consequences if they fail to do so, not because they view the reduction of CSR concerns as an investment 
decision. In other words, firms may consider CSR a “cost of doing business,” a potentially well-founded 
view in light of the risks associated with falling below benchmarks on the CSR concerns. For example, 
firms that perform poorly on the environmental or human rights dimensions open themselves up to a host 
of issues from unflattering media attention, to lawsuits, to boycotts (e.g., Strachan, et al., 1983; Davidson, 
et al., 1994; Baucus and Baucus, 1997; Haunschild, et al., 2006; Karpoff, et al., 2008; and Nossiter, 2010). 
Thus, firms may engage in the maximal amount of CSR concerns allowable to avoid attracting attention, 
which could readily result in an isomorphic pattern whereby peer organizations attempt to match their CSR 
activities (Matten & Moon, 2008).  
This view of CSR, like the view that it represents an investment decision, would result in many 
millions of dollars in CSR spending. Yet, firms following the business cost view would try to minimize 
their CSR spending and match it to peer organizations. Their CSR spending would not be sensitive to 
                                                          




exogenous changes in resources. In other words, the business cost view would suggest little or no 
relationship between resource changes and CSR concern reduction. Thus, we advance a competing 
Hypothesis 1B about the existence of a relationship between resources and CSR concerns:  
 
Hypothesis 1B: Firms consider CSR concern reduction a cost of doing business, resulting in little or no 
relationship between firm economic resources changes and CSR concerns. 
 
An initial, descriptive analysis of our data suggested that firm CSR activities do vary in accordance with 
resource availability, providing preliminary support for Hypothesis 1A. Thus, although we test the 
competing hypotheses more formally and exhaustively below, we also proceed to propose and test a series 
of predictions about the nature of the relationship between resource changes and CSR concerns.  
  
2.2.2 Investment Preferences and the Effect of Resource Availability on CSR Concerns 
If firms treat CSR the same as other investment opportunities, the negative impact of resource availability 
on CSR concerns should be similar in all firms. As noted above, however, the literature suggests that in the 
presence of financing frictions, access to external capital may influence not only aggregate investment but 
the types of investment choices firms make. If firms consider CSR as part of their investment portfolio, 
how do they prioritize CSR relative to their other investment opportunities (or do they)? One possibility is 
that firms, as a result of financing constraints, prioritize their investments via an investment hierarchy. 
Specifically, the financial slack theory of CSR (e.g., Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 
1997) suggests that firms have an investment hierarchy, with their core business investment needs placed 
at the top and their CSR activities lower on the list. Thus, firms invest in their business needs first and then 
invest in CSR and other more “discretionary” activities if and when any resources remain. Consistent with 
this argument, Benlemlih & Bitar (2016, p. 4) suggest that, “The level of resources that will be devoted to 
CSR activities in the short term depends mainly on the accessibility of resources not required for other 
purposes.” The critical implication is that financially unconstrained firms, which have more financial slack 
than financially constrained firms (by definition), may be more likely to invest in matters of social 
performance, like CSR concerns (Preston & O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Thus, financial 
constraint may moderate the relationship between firm resources and CSR concerns. 
Financial constraint is but one of several relevant organizational variables that may influence the 
structure of a firm’s investment hierarchy, as well as where CSR falls in that structure, and thus moderate 
the focal relationship. In particular, the CSR literature suggests three important variables that may give 
firms a “taste” for adjusting their CSR activities in response to resource changes: 1) political environment, 
2) corporate governance, and 3) analyst scrutiny. First, at least in public statements, the Democratic Party 
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appears to place more emphasis on CSR-related issues like environmental protection, antidiscrimination 
laws, etc. Consistent with this idea, a 2007 National Consumers League survey shows that 96% of 
Democrats believe Congress should ensure that companies address social issues, compared to 65% of 
Republicans9. Additionally, firms score higher on CSR when they are led by Democratic CEOs or are 
located in Democratic-leaning states (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014), and Democratic investment 
managers hold more socially responsible companies in their portfolios than do Republican managers (Hong 
and Kostovetsky, 2012). This evidence suggests that the CSR decisions of Democratic firms may be more 
sensitive to resource changes, which should amplify their reduction in CSR concerns after a resource gain 
but could also, intriguingly, amplify their increase in CSR concerns after a resource loss.  
The second potential moderator is corporate governance. The conventional economic perspective 
holds that firms should not internalize their negative externalities (Pigou, 1920) and that the “social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970). A recent study by Liang and 
Renneboog (2017) shows that common law countries, believed to have the best shareholder protections, 
foster the least CSR. In that case, we would expect little or no effect of resource availability on CSR 
concerns in well-governed firms, where managerial interests are more aligned with those of shareholders.  
The evidence presented above, however, suggests that customers and shareholders’ in the U.S. have 
recently become increasingly aware of firms’ CSR policies. Additionally, Servaes et al. (2013) show that 
CSR impacts firm value the most in firms with higher customer awareness. As investors and consumers 
place more value on CSR, firms may respond to this preference by directing more of the available resources 
to CSR. In this case, firms’ responsiveness to the availability of the economic resources should be greatest 
among firms with the best corporate governance. This conjecture is plausible in light of a recent study (e.g., 
Harjoto and Jo, 2011) showing that positive CSR behaviors are positively associated with governance 
characteristics.  
We use two proxies for the quality of corporate governance. First is an entrenchment index (E Index) 
developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), with higher numbers indicating higher managerial 
entrenchment and thus weaker corporate governance. The second proxy is a CEO’s equity-based 
compensation. Specifically we use CEO Delta, which is the dollar amount of a CEO’s wealth that is exposed 
to the firm’s stock prices. The use of equity-based compensation, especially by increasing the sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock price (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998), has grown rapidly in 
recent years (Murphy, 1999; Perry and Zenner, 2000). A higher delta means that CEOs share gains and 
losses with shareholders. Additionally, a higher delta increases managers’ exposure to risk (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Schrand and Unal, 1998; and Guay 1999) because it means they are 
                                                          




undiversified with respect to firm-specific wealth. Studies show that CEOs with higher deltas are thus more 
risk-adverse (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). For all of these reasons, a higher CEO delta 
is seen as aligning managers’ and shareholders’ incentives (Coles et al., 2006). Although the direction of 
the impact of corporate governance on where CSR ranks in investment hierarchy is not definitive, the 
literature reviewed above suggests that strong corporate governance would increase a firm’s willingness to 
adjust CSR concerns in response to resource changes.  
As a final potential moderator, we consider infomediaries like analysts, who play an active role in 
influencing a firm’s public exposure and could thus increase the risks of engaging in excessive CSR 
concerns. Firms with more infomediaries are scrutinized more closely by the public (Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Rao, 1994; Fombrun, 1996; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Security analysts, in particular, play an 
important role as corporate monitors and help reduce agency costs by making a firm’s actions public (Chung 
& Jo, 1996). Similarlyy, Knyazeva (2007) and Yu (2008) view analysts as additional monitoring 
mechanisms and argue that analyst coverage imposes discipline on misbehaving managers, helping to align 
managers with shareholders. Finally, Harjoto and Jo (2011) show that firms with more analysts tend to have 
higher CSR ratings. Thus, it is natural to expect that firms with more analysts will be more concerned about 
the risks associated with CSR concerns and, much like firms with strong governance, will be more reactive 
to resource changes when setting CSR policies.   
Overall, the above logic all supports the same basic idea: that firms have a hierarchy of investment 
priorities, and CSR’s rank in that hierarchy varies depending on a predictable set of moderators (financial 
constraint, political environment, governance, and analyst scrutiny). Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms have investment preferences, such that the effect of economic resources on CSR is 
stronger in financially unconstrained firms, Democratically-led firms, better governed firms, and firms with 
more analyst scrutiny. 
 
Across all of these moderators, it is important to note that the relationship may go both directions. 
In other words, the moderators are likely to exacerbate the tendency of positive real estate shocks to reduce 
CSR concerns, but also the tendency of negative real estate shocks to increase CSR concerns. This makes 
sense if firms view CSR as an investment project that is subject to the availability of resources, but it also 
generates some interesting and potentially counterintuitive possibilities, e.g., that Democratically-led firms 
may increase concerns more readily than Republican-led firms in lean economic environments. 
 
 2.2.3 Prospect Theory and the Pattern of the Effect of Resource Availability on CSR       
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Do resource gains and losses have symmetric effects on firms’ CSR decisions? The answer is important for 
many reasons, including the potentially varying implications of recessionary and expansionary economic 
conditions for CSR concerns.  
To address this issue, we draw from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): a basic theory 
of human choice suggesting that people react differently to perceived gains and losses. Although gains are 
preferred to losses, “losses loom larger than gains,” meaning that the “pain” associated with a $1 loss is 
greater than the “pleasure” associated with a $1 gain. This leads to an S-shaped utility curve with a steeper 
curve in the loss domain. 
In addition to explaining a wide variety of individual behaviors, prospect theory has been 
effectively applied to firm behavior (Allison, 1971; Bowman, 1982; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988). 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), for example, showed that firms whose performance fell below an 
aspiration point (a perceived loss) became risk-seeking, whereas firms whose performance rose above an 
aspiration point (a perceived gain) became risk-averse. Additionally, university endowments actively 
reduced their payouts following negative financial market shocks, but did not increase their payouts 
following positive shocks (Brown et al., 2014). These are just two of many studies suggesting that firms, 
like the individuals who lead them, demonstrate behavior reflective of prospect theory. The probable reason 
is just that: firms are led by CEOs and top management teams, whose own decisions are influenced by 
prospect theory (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988; Fiegenbaum, et al., 1996; Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; and Sanders, 2001). Since those decisions become firm policy 
(e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005), firm behavior 
mirrors the dictates of individual-level prospect theory. Research has provided a wealth of support for the 
idea that top managers’ decisions mediate the effects of individual-level prospect theory on firm-level 
behavior. For example, in the university study mentioned above, asymmetric payouts were particularly 
evident in endowments whose value was close to the benchmark value at the start of the university 
president’s tenure, suggesting that the university president was experiencing market losses rather personally 
and acutely.    
For the current paper, the critical implications of prospect theory and its asymmetric S-shaped curve are 
that people and organizations that perceive an outcome as a loss tend to become relatively more risk-seeking 
to reverse the loss, whereas those who perceive a gain become more risk-averse to preserve the gain. This 
suggests that firms will increase their CSR concerns more aggressively after a negative real estate shock 
than they will reduce their concerns after a positive shock. Additionally, prospect theory’s “certainty effect” 
suggests that sure losses or gains have stronger behavioral effects than tenuous losses or gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Thus, we predict that the effect of resource availability on CSR concerns will be 
stronger in the domain of losses, and strongest when losses or gains are relatively more permanent: 
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Hypothesis 3: Firms increase CSR concerns more readily after a loss than they reduce CSR concerns after 
a gain (especially when gains or losses are more permanent).       
    
3. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Real Estate Shocks and CSR 
We start from the sample of active U.S. COMPUSTAT firms in 1993 with non-missing total assets, 
excluding firms in finance industries (SIC code between 6000 and 6999). We then collect data on the value 
of real estate assets for each firm. Specifically, following Chaney et al. (2012), we calculate the ratio of the 
accumulated depreciation of buildings (dpacb in Compustat) to the historic cost of buildings (fatb in 
Compustat) and multiply by the assumed mean depreciable life of 40 years (Chaney et al., 2012; Nelson et 
al., 2000). To calculate the average age of the real estate assets, we obtain the year of purchase for the real 
estate assets. Finally, for each firm’s real estate assets (fatp+fatb+fatc in Compustat), we use a real estate 
price index to estimate the market value of these real estate assets for 1993, and then calculate the market 
value for each year in the sample period (1993-2007). The accumulated depreciation on buildings is not 
available in COMPUSTAT after 1993. Therefore, we restrict our sample to firms active in 1993.   
To measure the market value of real estate, we use state-level real estate asset price indices from 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). The OFHEO provides a Home Price Index 
(HPI), which is a broad measure of the movement of single-family home prices in the United States10. HPI 
data are available at the state level since 197511. Figure 1 presents the trend of state-level HPI during the 
sample period. The trend appears to be monotonically increasing until the late 2000s, when it slows.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
We then match the state-level real estate price index with our accounting data using the state 
identifier from Compustat. RE Valuet is thus the market value of the real estate appearing on the 1993 
balance sheet in year t, scaled by lagged property, plant, and equipment. The impact of real estate price 
changes on firm resource may be different from the state-level housing price changes. By definition, the 
resource impact on firms is simultaneously determined by the original holding of real estate since the 
inception time of 1993, the state-level house prices, and how much firms expand after 1993. To illustrate, 
a firm that held substantial real estate assets in 1993 and did not purchase property after 1993 would clearly 
                                                          
10 Using residential real estate prices as a proxy for commercial real estate prices could be a source of noise. These 
two indices, however, are reasonably highly-correlated (0.57 at state-level). Furthermore, Chaney et al. (2012) use 
both proxies and show that their results do not depend on the price index used. 
11 Using state-level HPI yields more observations than MSA. We however reexamine our hypothesis by MSA HPI, 
and our main results hold.  
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benefit from subsequent housing price increases. In contrast, for a firm that held few real estate assets in 
1993 and/or kept purchasing real estate at market price, the impact of house price changes on firm resources 
would be determined by both the numerator (how much the value of the real estate assets held in 1993 
changes afterwards) and the denominator (how much real estate firms purchase at higher market prices 
afterwards). 
 Figure 2 presents the trend of the percentage of firms experiencing positive changes, suggesting 
resource gains, in RE Valuet during the sample period. It shows that the number of firms experiencing 
positive real estate shocks (and likely benefitting from it because of the gains from the difference between 
the higher market price and the lower historical purchasing price) increases steadily during the 1990s and 
the early 2000s before it starts to decline after 2003. Note that we are interested in the impacts of real estate 
shocks on individual firms, depending on their holding of real estate assets in 1993. Even though our data 
end before the collapse of the housing market starting in 2008, Figure 2 shows that the sample includes 
numerous firm-year observations with both positive and negative real estate shocks. In the regression 
analysis presented in the following section, we include both firm-level real estate shocks and the state-level 
housing price indices (HPI).   
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
 We define CSR concerns as corporate activities that KLD has recognized as having a socially 
disapproved impact on stakeholders like the community, employees, shareholders, customers and 
environment, etc. The KLD database contains firm-year data, including thirty-four binary scores in seven 
categories: corporate governance, employee relations, environment, community, diversity, human rights, 
and product quality and safety. The variable Concerns_allt is the total number of such concerns for a firm 
in year t. For instance, KLD indicates that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. had eleven concerns in 2005 in the 
following areas: community (other), corporate governance (high compensation), diversity (controversies 
and other), employee relations (union relations and other), environment (regulatory problems), human 
rights (labor rights concern), and three product concerns (safety, marketing and antitrust). Therefore the 
Concerns_allt score for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in 2005 is eleven. It increases to fifteen in 2006, and the 
increase is due to employee relations (health and safety concern), two more corporate governance concerns 
(political accountability concern and other), and community (negative economic impact). Figure 3 presents 
the number of average CSR concerns across all firms during the sample period. The number of concerns 
remains relatively stable around 2 and starts to increase significantly around 2004. 
 




3.2 Summary Statistics 
Because the KLD dataset starts to provide CSR scores for the S&P 500 in the 1990s, we end with a sample 
of 2,936 firm-year observations that have both CSR and real estate value information available. Table 1 
presents the summary statistics.  
Table 1 shows that the average number of CSR concerns is 2.227, ranging from zero to as many as 
18. The average RE Value is 0.496, suggesting that the market value of real estate accounts for almost half 
of our sample firms’ fixed assets. The untabulated median RE Value is 0.356, and it is comparable to the 
value of 0.280 reported by Chaney et al. (2012). They use the same data period as ours but include all firms 
that report real estate ownership in 1993. Due to data availability, we use a smaller sample that includes the 
larger firms, for which CSR data is available.      
We also report the state-level HPI volatility, which is the standard deviation of the state-level HPI 
during the sample period. The average value is 80.704. The untabulated statistics show that the five most 
volatile states/territories during the sample period are Massachusetts, New York, Washington D.C., 
California, and Rhode Island, and the least volatile are Nevada, Louisiana, West Virginia, Texas, and 
Oklahoma.  
As noted, our sample includes the largest public U.S. firms because of data availability. The 
summary shows that the average value of total assets is $7.321 billion, and the average value of market 
value of equity is $13.412 billion. To provide more insight into the sample, we rank our sample firms with 
the population of U.S. public firms by market value in each year, by quartiles. The summary statistics show 
that the average size quartile of our sample firms is 3.948, suggesting that they rank above the top 75th 
percentile level in each year during the sample period. The average market-to-book ratio of equity (MtB) 
of our sample is 3.751.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
To examine firms’ investment priorities, first via the financial constraint hypothesis, we measure 
firms’ financial constraints by their credit constraints. Following prior studies such as Denis et al. (2010), 
our measure of financial constraint is whether a firm has a bond rating (Rated). Table 1 shows that the 
average value of Rated is 0.706, suggesting that 70.6% of the sample observations have access to the credit 
market, whereas 29.4% are constrained in the sense of not having access. This high rate of access is not 
surprising given the relatively large size of the firms in our sample.   
Drawing from the literature, we construct several variables to explain why firms may have different 
“tastes” for adjusting their CSR concerns in response to resource changes. The first factor we explore is 
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political influence. We use two proxies for the influence of political preference. One is the local political 
preference of the firm’s surrounding area. Firms’ local political environment, such as whether it is located 
in a “Red” or “Blue” state, is known to influence their corporate social responsibility (Rubin, 2008). 
We measure local political preference by collecting data on all of the donations individuals across the U.S. 
make during each election cycle, and then sort them by five-digit zip codes. We code the local political 
environment as Local Dem if the donations made to Democratic parties during an election cycle are higher 
than the donations made to Republican parties (relatively few were made to other parties). Our results show 
that the average value of Local Dem is 0.302, suggesting that 30.2% of the firms are located in Democratic-
leaning areas. 
Our other political preference measure is the CEO’s political preference. Following Hong and 
Kostovetsky (2012) and others, we use CEOs’ political donations during election cycles as a proxy for their 
party affiliations. Individual donation data are obtained from the FEC website (www.fec.gov), which makes 
all federal contributions by individuals since 1979 publicly available, along with information like the 
donor’s address and employer, the donation amount, and the recipient of the donation. Donors can make 
direct donations to candidates or party committees (whose party affiliation can be identified though the 
FEC website). Because of the enormous size of the records for each election cycle, we first reduce the size 
of the file by matching the FEC data with the Execucomp database through donors’ occupations. We then 
use names to identify CEOs who make donations. CEO political preference is determined by the total 
amount of donations to each party during the whole sample period; they need not donate every election 
cycle to be included. A CEO is coded as a Rep CEO if he/she makes more donations to Republican 
candidates and parties during the whole sample period (about 28% of the sample) and Dem CEO in the 
converse case (about 10% of the sample). The remaining CEOs made no identifiable donations.  
Second, Table 1 presents the average quality of corporate governance, first using an entrenchment 
index (E Index) developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). The index ranges from 0-6, with higher 
numbers indicating higher managerial entrenchment and thus weaker corporate governance. The average 
value of E Index is 2.857. Our other proxy for corporate governance is CEO Delta, which is the dollar 
amount of a CEO’s wealth that is exposed to the firm’s stock prices. The delta calculation follows the 
procedure of Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002), using the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation 
model, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividends. Detailed information on the options granted 
to CEOs until 2006, including exercise price, maturity, and number of options issued, are obtained from 
ExecuComp. Stock volatility is estimated using daily stock information from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). Table 1 shows that the average dollar amount of CEO Delta is $1.090 million, 
suggesting that, on average, the value of a CEO’s stock holdings changes by $1.090 million when firm’s 
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stock price changes by 1%. This value is higher than the mean value of $0.6 million reported by Coles et 
al. (2006) because of a different sample period and set of firms12.   
The third moderator that may influence firms’ taste of CSR is infomediaries like analysts. We use 
the number of analysts following our sample firms as a proxy. The range is 0-30, and the average in our 
sample is 7.372.   
 
4. Main Results 
4.1 Economic Resources and CSR Concerns 
In this section, we test our first set of hypotheses on resource availability and CSR by examining the effect 
of real estate shocks on CSR concerns. Our goal is to provide initial evidence indicating whether firms treat 
CSR concerns as an investment decision, as suggested by a pattern of CSR investment that varies with 
resource changes. The baseline model that we use to run the main analysis is given by: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 =αi +δt +β∙RE Valueit +γ𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 + controlsit + ϵit                                                         (1)    
 
Where Concerns_all is the number of the CSR concerns in year t for firm i located in state l, RE Valueit is 
the market value of real estate asset in year t to lagged PPE, and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 is the state-level HPI price in state l in 
year t. 
 The coefficient 𝛽𝛽 � is the average effect of real estate shocks on CSR concerns. As argued earlier, 
this reduced form equation suggests that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 �will be negative. Therefore in a reduced form, 
the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 �  measures, for the average firm in the sample, the effects of real estate shocks on CSR 
activities, specifically the number of CSR concerns. 
 Our control variables are firm size measured by market value (LnMktt), market-to-book ratio (MtBt), 
and profitability (PITAt). These variables capture the effects of the changes in a firm’s specific risk, growth 
opportunity, and profits on its CSR concerns. We also include a firm fixed effect αi, as well as year fixed 
effects δt, to capture aggregate specific CSR shocks. Finally, the variable Plt controls for the overall impact 
of the real estate cycle on CSR concerns. Shocks ϵit are clustered at the state-year level. This correlation 
structure is conservative given that the explanatory variable of interest, RE Valueit, is defined at the firm 
level (see Bertrand, et al., 2004; Chaney, et al., 2012).   
 To summarize, RE Valueit measures the subsequent variations in the market values of the specific 
assets shown on firms’ 1993 balance sheet. β therefore measures how firms’ CSR concerns respond to each 
                                                          
12 Coles et al. (2006) study U.S. public firms during the sample period between 1992 and 2002, including a sample 
of 9,551 firm-year observations.  
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additional $1 of real estate the firm actually owns. This specification helps us to isolate our results from the 
state-level shocks that impact all firms with or without real estate assets. 
 Table 2 presents estimates of the equation. The dependent variable is the number of CSR concerns. 
All models control for year-specific and firm-specific effects, and errors are clustered at state-year level. 
Model 1 starts with the simplest estimation, including just RE Valueit without additional controls. It shows 
that a one percentage increase in the market value of real estate assets reduces the number of CSR concerns 
by 0.430. Or, put another way, a 2.325 percentage increase in the market value of real estate assets leads to 
one reduction in the number of CSR concerns. The adjusted R2 is 0.737, suggesting that RE Valueit and the 
controls explain a significant portion of the change in CSR concerns in a given year, for a given firm.  
Model 2 includes the additional control variables. The coefficient on RE Valueit remains significant 
at the 1% level, though the magnitude decreases slightly. The control variables yield interesting insights 
too. Firm size increases CSR concerns. The coefficient of LnMkt is 0.164 and significant at the 1% level. 
Both growth opportunities and profitability reduce CSR concerns, which are consistent with the literature 
that reports a positive link between firm performance and CSR ratings. Our results therefore support 
Hypothesis 1A, that firms consider CSR concern reduction an investment decision, resulting in a negative 
relationship between firm resources and CSR concerns. 
 
4.2 When Do Firms Invest in CSR Concern Reduction? The Investment Preference Analysis 
To test our hypotheses regarding the existence of an investment hierarchy and location of CSR concerns in 
the hierarchy, we examine how resource availability impacts CSR concerns in various subsamples divided 
by financial constraints, political influence, corporate governance, and analyst scrutiny. We first split firms 
by their financial constraints. As a reminder, the financial slack argument suggests that the effects of a real 
estate shock should be especially pronounced for firms without financial constraints, as they have already 
met their financing needs, and any real estate gains represent genuine financial slack. Firms with financial 
constraints, conversely, suffer underinvestment, so real estate gains may be prioritized to remedy 
underinvestment (Chaney et al., 2012).  
 Our measure of financial constraints is credit constraints, operationalized as bond ratings assigned 
by S&P (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). We do not use firm size as a proxy, as in Almeida et 
al. (2004), because the firms in our sample are all large compared to the population of public firms. There 
are a variety of ways of identifying financial constraints, and there is no general agreement on which 
measure is best proxy. Since previous studies (e.g., Chaney et al., 2012) suggest that real estate shocks 
impact investment through the value of collateral and thus debt capacity, credit constraints best suit our 
research question. And two main motivations for using bond rating as a popular proxy for financial 
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constraints are all related with debt financing (Faulkender and Petersen 2006), which fit our research 
design the best. 
We split the sample into the financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms and first tested 
whether the relationship between real estate shocks and CSR concerns differed between these two groups 
of firms. Additionally, we created an interaction variable consisting of real estate shocks and financial 
constraints; the results are presented in Model 1 of Table 3. The results show that unconstrained firms show 
a significantly larger reduction in CSR concerns than constrained firms after a positive real estate shock. 
We then rerun our baseline equation for each subsample. The results are reported in Models 2 and 3 of 
Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
 The results of Model 2 and 3 show that the coefficient on RE Valueit is significant and negative only 
for the group of unconstrained firms (which constitute the majority of our sample). Specifically, the 
coefficient is -0.885 (significant at the 1% level), suggesting that a one percentage increase (decrease) in 
RE Value leads to almost one reduction (addition) to the number of CSR concerns.13  
 Our results thus provide initial support for Hypothesis 2, that firms have an investment hierarchy 
and that CSR falls lower than core business investments in the hierarchy, as evidenced by the weaker 
relationship between resource changes and CSR concerns in financially constrained firms. In particular, a 
sudden real estate gain (loss) does not appear to impact CSR concerns for constrained firms; the coefficient 
is 0.004 for these firms. Therefore, in light of studies showing that real estate shocks increase firms’ debt 
capacity and investment, especially for financially constrained firms (Chaney et al., 2012), our results 
suggest that constrained firms may not have enough slack left over to reduce their CSR concerns. In other 
words, financial constraints represent an important moderator of the relationship between resources and 
CSR concerns, suggesting that CSR concerns do not rank among the highest priorities for financially 
constrained firms. 
 Indeed, to test our assumption that financially constrained firms would invest any unexpected 
windfalls in the good projects that their financial constraints previously forced them to pass up, we replace 
the dependent variable with investment in capital expenditure and intangible assets. The results are shown 
in Panel B of Table 3. The results show that real estate shocks increase financially constrained firms’ 
                                                          
13 This negative effect of resource availability on CSR concerns in unconstrained firms becomes even larger in states 
with relatively stable HPI prices (where gains and losses are more “certain,” in the parlance of prospect theory). The 
coefficient is -1.558 (significant at 1%), suggesting that a one percentage increase (decrease) in real estate value leads 




investment in capital expenditure and intangible assets significantly, though there is only a directional rather 
than a significant difference between the constrained and unconstrained firms. These results support our 
assumptions about investment priorities. For financially unconstrained firms, real estate shocks increase 
their acquisition of tangible assets and intangible assets (e.g., through M&A or patents).    
Next, we test Hypothesis 2 by examining the other three factors that may impact firms’ taste for 
CSR.  The first measure is local political preference, and the results are presented in Table 4. Red states 
refers to those states with more residents donating to the Republican party, and Blue states refers to those 
with more residents donating to the Democratic party. To provide more insight into the impact of political 
preference, we add two new political variables, Reppresidentt and Repmajorityt, to the baseline model. 
RepMajorityt is one if the majority of the Senate Majority Leader is Republican.  These two new variables 
are included to capture the political environment for CSR. We first test whether firms use resources 
differently as a function of their local political preference. The interaction variable between real estate 
shocks and Blue state (capturing the difference between these and the Red states) is negative and significant 
at the 5% level, suggesting that firms located in states with different political climates make different types 
of adjustments to CSR concerns following real estate shocks.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
 We then report the results in subsamples. Model 3 of Table 4 shows that the previously reported 
negative relationship of real estate shocks is particularly driven by firms located in Democratic-leaning 
areas. The coefficient is -0.439 (significant at 1%). The coefficient is negative but not significant for firms 
located in Republican-leaning areas. These results suggest that resource availability is a particularly 
important driver of CSR concern adjustments for firms with Democratic preferences; they decrease CSR 
concerns more readily after gains but may also increase CSR concerns more readily after losses. For firms 
with Republican-leaning preferences, CSR concerns are not very responsive to resource shocks, suggesting 
that factors other than economic resources may have more influence on the CSR behavior of firms with 
Republican preferences. Although our results are consistent with Rubin (2008), who finds that companies 
with a high (low) CSR ratings tend to be located in Democratic (Republican) states and counties, we 
additionally find that local political preference exacerbates the resource effect of real estate shocks on CSR 
concerns (in both directions). 
 To provide further evidence on the interactive effects of political influence, we next examine the 
influence of the CEO’s political affiliation on the resource / CSR concern relationship. We rerun the 
baseline equation, adding variables for the CEO’s political affiliation. We also keep the two variables that 
measure the general political environment for CSR activities. The main results are very similar without 
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these additional control variables. The results are reported in Table 5. We include Dem CEO and Rep CEO 
separately because our models are run at firm-level. Thus, the coefficient on Dem CEO indicates the effects 
on CSR concerns when the firm switches to a Democratic-leaning CEO, and the coefficient on Rep CEO 
indicates the effects on CSR concerns when the firm switches to a Republican-leaning CEO.  
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
 Model 1 of Table 5 shows that when a firm switches to a Democratic-leaning CEO, the firm’s 
number of CSR concerns decreases by 0.353 (significant at the 1% level), and Model 5 shows that when a 
firm switches to a Republican-leaning CEO, the firm’s number of CSR concerns increases by 0.205 
(significant at the 5% level). These results support the findings of Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), who 
show that firms score higher on CSR when they are led by Democratic CEOs or are headquartered in 
Democratic-leaning states. 
More relevant for our predictions, though, we next examine whether CEOs differentially apply 
resources to CSR as a function of political preferences. We create interaction variables consisting of real 
estate shocks and the CEO’s personal political preference. The results for Democratic CEOs and Republican 
CEOs are reported in Models 2 and 6 of Table 5, respectively. We do not find support for the idea that, 
when firms switch to Democratic-leaning CEOs or Republican-leaning CEOS, these switches affect the 
way in which the CEO applies economic resources to CSR concerns. 
This lack of differences was puzzling, so we sought to unpack it by examining the role of a 
theoretically-relevant variable described above: real estate price volatilities. We split the sample into states 
with relatively stable or unstable state-level HPI prices, classifying the states in relation to the mean state-
level HPI volatility of 80.704. The results are reported in Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Table 5, respectively. We 
find that the coefficient on the interaction between Dem CEO and RE Valueit is -1.829 (significant at 5%), 
suggesting that the negative effect of RE Value on CSR concerns is stronger in firms that switch to 
Democratic-leaning CEOs than for all other firms. We do not find a significant relationship for Republican-
leaning CEOs when splitting by the stability of state-level HPI prices.  
In other words, our data suggest that, at least when price volatility is considered, the negative effects 
of RE Value on CSR concerns are especially evident when firms switch to Democratic CEOs. For example, 
in states with stable HPI indices, a one percentage increase (decrease) in RE Value leads to 1.8 reductions 
in (additions to) CSR concerns for firms that switched to Democratic CEOs in the same year of the real 
estate shock; this impact is about twelve times higher than the effect for firms that switched to Republican 
CEOs at the time of shock, suggesting that Democratic-leaning CEOs are more responsive to resource 
changes when making CSR decisions (again, in both directions). 
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Next, we examine investment priorities as a function of corporate governance. As noted, we use 
two proxies for interest alignment: CEO stock-based compensation and managerial entrenchment. The 
results are reported in Table 6. We split the sample by CEO delta and by the median value of E index, 
respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
We first use an interaction variable to examine whether there is significant difference between the 
coefficients of the subsamples. Results of Model 1 (Table 6) show that the real estate shocks impact CSR 
concerns significantly more negatively in firms with CEOs who have greater wealth tied to firm stock 
performance. Results in Models 2 and 3 indicate that the negative effect of real estate shocks on CSR is 
significant and driven by firms with CEOs who have a higher delta. Models 4 to 6 show that, although the 
coefficient is slightly more negative for the group of firms with less entrenched CEOs, there is no significant 
difference in the coefficients of real estate shocks between the subsamples split by E index.      
In sum, our results suggest that a CEO’s stock-based compensation, which is designed to align the 
CEO’s interests with shareholders’, affords a “taste” for CSR concern reduction. 
 Lastly, to capture the effect of analyst scrutiny on CSR policies, we measure the number of analysts 
following the firm. To test our conjecture, we split the sample into firms with and without financial analysts, 
and those with more and fewer financial analysts. The results are presented in Table 7. In Models 5 and 6, 
the sample is split by the median number of analysts, which is six for our sample. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
 We first examine the difference in the coefficients between the subsamples; the results in Models 
1 and 4 of Table 7 show that analyst coverage significantly influences how firms utilize resources created 
by real estate shocks. The interactions between real estate shocks and each analyst variable are both negative 
and significant at the 1% level.  
We then present results in split samples.  Model 3 of Table 7 shows that, for firms with any analyst 
following, the coefficient is -0.374 (significant at the 1% level). This negative impact increases to -0.906 
when the number of analysts following is six or more (significant at the 1% level). Our results are consistent 
with the literature on the role of analysts in increasing monitoring and aligning interests, and they suggest 




In sum, we find that CSR represents a more attractive investment opportunity for some firms than 
others. The effect of resource shocks on CSR concerns vary by financial constraints, political environment, 
CEO incentives, and analyst scrutiny. Thus, firms not only see CSR concern reduction as an investment 
decision; they see it as a more or less attractive investment option as a function of these factors.  
 
4.3 Responses to Resource Gains and Losses.  
As explained earlier, prospect theory suggests that the negative relationship between resource availability 
and CSR concerns should be stronger when firms experience negative (versus positive) resource shocks. In 
this section, we formally test this prediction by splitting the baseline equation into those firm-year 
observations associated with positive real estate shocks and those with negative shocks. The results are 
reported in Panel A of Table 8. Furthermore, based on prospect theory’s implication that sure gains and 
losses are more motivating than tenuous gains and losses, we split the sample into subsamples according to 
the state-level HPI volatility. We predicted that the observed trends would be more evident in states with 
relatively stable HPI prices, suggesting sure gains or sure losses. 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
 We first examine the difference in the coefficients between the resource gain and loss subsamples. 
Model 1 of Table 8 shows that firms adjust CSR concerns asymmetrically in response to gains and losses. 
Specifically, firms are more willing to increase CSR concerns after losses than to reduce them after gains. 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 8 report the results for the groups of firms with real estate gains or losses, and the 
results show that the coefficient on RE Valueit is 0.678 (significant at the 1% level) for the group of firm-
years experiencing negative real estate shocks, which is about four times larger than the coefficient for the 
group of firm-years with positive shocks. This result supports the prediction of prospect theory that losses 
will loom larger than gains—that firms more aggressively revise their CSR policies after negative than 
positive real estate shocks. Put differently, they increase their CSR concerns following losses more readily 
than they reduce their CSR concerns following gains (a potentially troubling result). Models 4 to 6 of Table 
8 show that the observed steeper slope in the resource-loss firm-years is particularly apparent in states with 
low HPI volatilities, which is consistent with prospect theory’s “certainty effect,” indicating that sure losses 
and sure gains factor more heavily than uncertain losses and gains. 
 Given the increasing public attention to socially disapproved behaviors, an interesting (exploratory) 
question is how firms change their CSR policies, especially when they allow their CSR concerns to increase. 
Is there an order in which they assume additional concerns? To provide insight, we reexamine the baseline 
model by replacing the Concerns_all variable with the seven specific categories. In the interest of space, 
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we only report the categories on which RE Value has a significant impact. The results, reported in Panel B 
of Table 9, show that when firms experience positive real estate shocks, they first reduce employee concerns 
(union relations, health and safety issues, workforce reductions, retirement benefits, etc.)14. When firms 
experience negative real estate shocks, however, they also increase concerns related to employees, as well 
as corporate governance and their products. Corporate governance concerns include issues like high 
compensation, ownership, accounting, transparency, and political accountability; product concerns include 
product safety, marketing issues, and antitrust. In addition to providing interesting insights into the kinds 
of concerns firms are willing to assume, these results shed additional light on Hypothesis 3, that firms 
assume additional concerns (after resource losses) more readily than they reduce concerns after resource 
gains. 
 
4.4 Robustness test: The channel through which real estate creates economic resources 
Our empirical design relies on the assumption that the change in real estate value impacts the availability 
of economic resources. Chaney et al. (2012) specifically suggest that real estate value impacts a firm’s 
investments by affecting its pledgeable assets and therefore its debt capacity. To test our assumptions, we 
empirically examine this potential mechanism for the effect of real estate shocks on CSR concerns.  
 We first examine how shocks in real estate value impact debt financing, which is measured by the 
issuance of bonds and the proceeds raised from new bond issuance. The bond issuance information is 
collected from Thomson One. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 9. 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
 The dependent variable in the logit regression analysis is a dummy variable coded one when 
firms issue new bond securities and zero if not. The results of the logit regression are reported in Model 1 
of Table 9. The dependent variable for the Tobit analysis is the natural logarithm of the proceeds from 
bond issuance plus one dollar. The value therefore is zero for firms that do not issue new bonds in a given 
year. The results of the Tobit model are reported in Model 2 of Table 9. Both models control year and 
industry effects.  
 The results suggest that firms are more likely to issue bonds when they experience positive real 
estate shocks, supporting the impact of real estate shocks on the value of pledgeable assets. Model 2 of 
Table 9 also suggests that, conditional on a firm issuing new bond securities, greater real estate shocks 
lead to greater proceeds raised.  
                                                          
14 For a detailed definition, please see Appendix A. 
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 In Panel B of Table 9, we run the base model of real estate shocks on CSR concerns, testing whether 
the coefficient on real estate shocks differs between the subsamples of firm-years that issue bonds or do 
not. The coefficient on real estate shocks is -1.135 in the subsample of firms that issue bond securities, 
much higher than the -0.193 in the subsample of firms without bond issuance. The interaction between real 
estate shocks and bond issuance is significant and negative as shown in Model 3 of Table 9, suggesting that 
the difference in the coefficients observed in Models 1 and 2 is statistically significantly. The results of 
Panel B support our assumption that real estate shocks impact firms’ economic resources through debt 
financing, which leads to changes in firms’ CSR behaviors. 
 
 
5 Conclusions      
Overall, our research suggests that firms regard adjustments to CSR concerns as investment decisions, 
influenced by the availability of economic resources. We show that resource gains reduce CSR concerns, 
while resource losses increase them. This finding contributes to the CSR literature by providing the first 
known empirical and causal evidence of a link from resource availability to CSR concerns. This evidence 
complements recent findings documenting a link from CSR to firm performance (e.g., Benlemlih & Bitar, 
2016; Cheng et al., 2014), suggesting the possibility of a bidirectional process and possibly a feedback loop. 
Future research could fruitfully investigate the intriguing possibility of reciprocal causation.  
Additionally, our results show that the relative impact of economic resources on CSR concerns 
depends on several organizational variables that influence the structure of a firm’s investment priorities 
(financial constraint, political climate, CEO compensation, and analyst scrutiny). These results extend past 
findings documenting a link between such factors and CSR itself (e.g., Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 
2014; Benlemlih & Bitar, 2016), suggesting that these factors influence not only a firm’s absolute level of 
CSR, but also its willingness to change CSR policy in response to exogenous forces.  
Finally, based on prospect theory, we show that firm reactions to resource gains and losses are 
asymetric. Our theoretical explanation is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): a well-known 
theory suggesting that “losses loom larger than gains,” and that people prefer relatively “safe” courses of 
action after gains (particularly sure gains), even while they take substantial restorative risks following losses 
(particularly sure losses). Our empirical results not only support the negative relation between resource 
availability and CSR concerns; they also show that the negative effect looms larger when firms experience 
resource losses than gains. In other words, firms appear more willing to increase their socially disapproved 
behaviors after a loss than decrease them after a gain (particularly in low-volatility states, where the gains 
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and losses are more “sure”). These troubling findings suggest that challenging economic conditions could 
produce a proliferation of regression on social responsibilities. 
In conclusion, our study attempts to resolve theoretical puzzles in the CSR literature and shed 
practical light on the ways to discourage socially disapproved behavior. The fact that at least some firms, 
under some conditions, use resource gains to reduce CSR concerns is notable. Yet, so is the fact that firms 
readily regress on their social responsibility when they experience resource losses. Our study offers a new 
explanation for both sides of the proverbial coin, suggesting that, when it comes to consequential choices 
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Summary Statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample firms. Size Quartile is the quartile ranking of the firm among 
all public U.S. firms in the given fiscal year by its market value of equity.  This value ranges from 1 to 4, where higher 
values indicate larger size. MtB is the market-to-book ratio of equity. Rated is a dummy variable, and it is one if the 
firm has an S&P credit rating. Total CSR Concerns is the total number of CSR concerns reported by KLD. RE Value 
is the market value of real estate assets to lagged property, plant, and equity. HPI Volatility is the standard deviation 
of the state-level HPI during the sample period. Eindex is the entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009). The index ranges from zero to six, with higher numbers indicating higher managerial entrenchment 
and therefore worse corporate governance.  CEO Delta is the sensitivity of CEO wealth (including options and 
common stock holdings) to a 1% change in the value of the firm’s stock price. Local Dem is a dummy variable, and 
it is one if the donations made to Democratic party during an election cycle are higher than the donations made to 
other parties. Specifically, we collect all the donations residents make during each election cycle and sort them by 
five-digit zip codes. Dem CEO is one if the CEO donates to the Democratic party during the sample period and Rep 
CEO otherwise. Rep President is one for the years when the President is Republican. Number of Analysts is retrieved 
from I/B/E/S and it is the number of analysts that provide recommendations for the firm.      
 Average 
(n=2,936) 
Stdv. Min. Max. 
Total Assets ($mil.) 7,321.060 13,402.390 66.420 163,514 
Market Value ($mil.) 13,412.200 33,788.730 17.749 460, 767.900 
Size Quartile 3.948 0.222 3 4 
MtB 3.751 3.409 0.439 21.107 
Rated 0.706 0.456 0 1 
Total CSR Concerns 2.227 2.241 0 18 
REValue 0.496 0.613 0.001 10.915 
HPI Volatility 80.704 42.089 25.947 179.125 
Eindex 2.857 1.228 0 6 
CEO Delta ($mil.) 1.090 2.325 0 14.760 
Local Dem 0.302 0.459 0 1 
Dem CEO 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Rep CEO 0.282 0.450 0 1 
Rep President 0.645 0.479 0 1 






Economic Resources and CSR Concerns 
 
This table presents the empirical link between the value of real estate and CSR concerns. The dependent variable is 
the number of CSR concerns. Ptl is the state-level HPI index. LnMktt is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
value of equity. MTBt is the market-to-book ratio of equity. PITAt is the pretax income scaled by total assets. All 
regressions control for year and firm fixed effects and cluster observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 





Ptl  -0.001 
(0.969) 
LnMktt  0.164*** 
(0.007) 
MTBt  -0.033*** 
(0.004) 
PITAt  -0.827** 
(0.027) 
CHETAt  0.051 
(0.906) 
   
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 472 472 
Firms  367 367 
Obs. 2,936 2,936 










Resource Effect on CSR Concerns and Investment Priority: by Financial Constraints 
 
This table presents the results by financial constraints. The control variables are the same as those used in table 2. Constrained refers to those firms that are not 
rated by S&P, and Unconstrained refers to those with credit ratings from S&P. Panel A presents the effect of real estate shocks on CSR concerns by financial 
constraints and by real estate price volatility. Panel B presents the effect of real estate shocks on firms’ other investments such as capital expenditure (CAPEX) and 
intangible assets by financial constraints. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects and cluster observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
Panel A: Impacts on CSR Concerns 
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 Total Constrained Unconstrained 











































Year and Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 472 334 417 
Firms  364 164 241 
Obs. 2,914 858 2,056 






Panel B: Impacts on Alternative Investments 
 CAPEX  Intangible Assets 
 Total  Constrained Unconstrained  Total Constrained Unconstrained 




















































































Control Variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 618 533 518  618 533 518 
Firms  643 380 421  643 380 421 
Obs. 6,323 2,648 3,675  6,323 2648 3,675 





Resource Effect on CSR Concerns and Investment Priority: by Local Political Preferences 
 
This table presents the results by local political preferences. The control variables in columns 1 and 2 are the same as 
those used in Table 2. Columns 3 to 5 add more political variables to the baseline model. Red states refers to those 
states with more residents donating to the Republican party, and Blue states refers to those with more residents 
donating to theDemocratic party. Reppresidentt is one if the incumbent President is Republican and zero otherwise. 
RepMajorityt is one if the majority of the Senate Majority Leader is Republican. All regressions control for year and 
firm fixed effects and cluster observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels.  
 
  Baseline Model + political variables 
  All Red states Blue states 
  1 2 3 






REValueit*Blue  -0.251** 
(0.045) 
  
Blue states  -0.009 
(0.923) 
  












Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster  472 406 290 
Firms   367 313 208 
Obs.  2,936 1,987 861 







Resource Effect on CSR Concerns and Investment Priority: by CEO Political Preferences 
 
This table presents the results by CEO political preferences. The control variables are the same as those used in table 
2 plus the political variables used in Table 5. Dem CEO refers to those CEOs who donate to the Democratic party 
during the sample period and Rep CEO refers to those who donate to the Republican party during the sample period. 
Low Vol refers to those firms located in states with less volatile HPI prices, and High Vol otherwise. The sample is 
divided by the mean value of the volatility of the state-level HPI prices. All regressions control for year and firm fixed 
effects and cluster observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels.  
 
  Dem CEOs   Rep CEOs 
 All All Low Vol High Vol  All All Low Vol High Vol 
 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 






     








     

































Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 472 472 282 190  472 472 290 190 
Firms  367 364 231 136  367 367 208 136 
Obs. 2,936 2,936 1,813 1,121  2,936 2,936 861 1,121 






Resource Effect on CSR Concerns and Investment Priority: by Corporate Governance 
  
This table presents the results by corporate governance. We split the sample by the median value of E Index and CEO Delta, respectively. The control variables 
are the same as those used in Table 2. Weak Governance/Good Governance refers to those firms with E Index higher/lower than the median value, suggesting 
more/less entrenched management. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects and cluster observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
  CEO Incentives  E Index 
  Total Lower Delta Higher Delta  Total Weak Governance Strong Governance 
  1 2 3  4 5 6 












REValueit*Higher Delta  -0.430*** 
(0.000) 
      
Higher Delta  0.164* 
(0.099) 
      
REValueit*Strong Governance      -0.068 
(0.663) 
  
Strong Governance      0.081 
(0.568) 
  
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster  470 364 416  467 409 372 
Firms   367 249 284  346 276 179 
Obs.  2,866 1,018 1,848  2,820 1,657 1,163 






Resource Effect on CSR Concerns and Investment Priority: by Analyst Coverage 
 
This table presents the results by the number of analysts following the firm. We split the sample by whether the firm has analyst coverage or not and by the median 
number of analysts following. The control variables are the same as those used in Table 2. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects and cluster 
observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 Total  Without Analyst 
Coverage 





















      
Analyst Coverage 0.265** 
(0.036) 
      
REValueit*More analysts     -0.352*** 
(0.005) 
  
More analysts     0.363*** 
(0.000) 
  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 472 138 464  472 403 379 
Firms  364 72 352  367 307 232 
Obs. 2,914 164 2,750  2,936 1,475 1,461 







Resource Effect on CSR Concerns: by Prospect Theory 
 
This table presents the results by whether real estate shocks create gains or losses and by the volatility of the state-level HPI index. The control variables are the 
same as those used in Table 2. Firms experience a Gain in resources when there are the positive real estate shocks and a Loss when there are negative real estate 
shocks. Low Vol refers to those firms located in states with less volatile HPI prices, and High Vol otherwise. The sample is divided by the mean value of the 
volatility of the state-level HPI prices. Panel A presents the results for the total number of CSR concerns. Panel B presents the results for the number of CSR 
concerns in the categories that have significant results for the main variable. See details of CSR categories in the Appendix. All regressions control for year and 
firm fixed effects and cluster observations at state-year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
Panel A: Total CSR Concerns 
 All  Low Vol  High Vol 
 Total  Gain Loss  Total Gain Loss  Total  Gain Loss 





















   -0.343*** 
(0.000) 





   0.141* 
(0.083) 
   0.008 
(0.945) 
  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 444 277 409  266 146 252  178 131 157 
Firms  360 251 350  225 132 221  135 119 129 
Obs. 2,735 773 1,962  1,690 342 1,348  1,045 431 614 
Adj. R2 0.750 0.748 0.751  0.744 0.683 0.764  0.756 0.793 0.735 
 
Panel B: CSR Categories 
 Gain  Loss 
 Concerns_Employee  Concerns_Employee Concerns_Corproate Governance Concerns_Product 









Control Variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 277  409 409 409 
Firms  251  350 350 350 
Obs. 773  1,962 1,962 1,962 








Economic Resources and CSR Concerns: The Channel through Bond Issuance 
Panel A: Real estate shocks and bond issuance 
 DV: New Issuance DV: Proceeds of New Issuance 
 Logit Tobit 





































   
Year and Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,063 6,321 
Adj. R2 0.295 0.152 
 
Panel B: Real estate shocks and CSR: by bond issuance 
 DV: CSR concerns  
 With New Issuance of Bond Without New Issuance of Bond All  







Bond Issuancet   0.223** 
(0.014) 
REValueit* Bond Issuancet   -0.417*** 
(0.008) 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes  
Year and Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State-year Cluster 472 472 472 
Firms  367 367 367 
Obs. 2,936 2,936 2,936 










The Trend in State-level HPI 
 
Figure 2 
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